Abstract: I explore the interaction between theory-based interpretations of scientific evidence and constraints on theories provided by that evidence. Interpretation is often viewed as a source of error and a reason for scepticism about scientific results. But, I argue, while interpretation does generate epistemic risk, it also points to new sources of evidence that can constrain our theories. This is especially clear in the development of instrumentation that increases the range of our interactions with nature. While the design of such instruments and the interpretation of their outputs are deeply dependent on theory-based interpretations, these outputs can still challenge those very theories. At the same time, theory-guided instrumentation provides us access to aspects of nature that we cannot study with our unaided senses. This access allows us to extend the range of evidence that we collect, and thus increases the constraints on our theories. As a result, theory-guided evidence collection has a positive impact on the prospects of scientific realism since these increasing constraints on our theories provide our only reason for thinking that we may be approaching the development of true theories.
Introduction
According to a tradition at least as old as Descartes, we achieve maximum epistemic reliability when we contemplate the momentary contents of our own minds. Any step beyond contemplation, such as those requiring inference, judgment, or interpretation, introduces the possibility of error. At present, recognition that theory-dependent interpretation plays a central role in scientific research and in the evaluation of theories provides the basis for one major form of anti-realist argument. Recognition of the pervasive role of interpretation in science is a key feature of the transformation in our understanding of science that emerged in the 1950s. For logical empiricism, which allows little scope for interpretation in science, uninterpreted sensory experience provides both the semantic and epistemic foundations of science. On the semantic side, terms of our language that can be directly associated with sense experience are considered non-problematic and taken to constitute our basic vocabulary. The meanings of other terms must then be established on the basis of their relation to this basic vocabulary-a thesis that is particularly problematic for terms introduced to refer to items we cannot detect with our senses.
On the epistemic side, all propositions whose content goes beyond a summary of our sensory experience must be justified on the basis of sensory experience.
In several respects, the new approach reversed the relation between sensory evidence and theory by attributing a primary role to theories. The meanings of theoretical terms, it was suggested, are determined by implicational relations among the terms in a theory, while sensory evidence does not play a role in science until it has been interpreted in terms of a theoretical language. This view of meaning was not well developed by the best-known exponents of this new approach and I will not pursue the topic here. 1 Instead, I will focus on the role of empirical evidence in evaluating theories, and especially on the claim that such evidence is, somehow, theory-dependent. I will argue that while, properly understood, this thesis is important and correct, it is only part of the story. In science, theory-dependent evidence always involves interpretation of some input that is independent of the theory in question and that limits the range of admissible interpretations. In addition, I will argue, theories play a central role in expanding the body of empirical constraints that provide the grounds for evaluating theories. Thus an adequate understanding of how science develops, and of the prospects for some form of scientific realism, require that we grasp the interplay between interpretation and constraint, and that we pay special attention to the scientific drive to increase the range of constraints on our interpretations.
Theory Dependence
The literature on theory-dependent evidence contains several distinct theses that are often lumped together; I will consider five. The strongest thesis is that our beliefs are so deeply implicated in what we perceive that we end up perceiving only what we expect to perceive. As a result, the story goes, scientists committed to a theory fail to notice anomalies that would challenge that theory. This seems to be the claim that Kuhn is defending in his discussion of the anomalous-card experiment in which subjects who are given brief glimpses of unusual cards report seeing a normal card. For example, a red ace in the shape of a spade is described as an ace of spades-although given a bit more time, most subjects of the experiment correctly report the item before them (Bruner and Postman 1949) . Kuhn (1962, 64) offers this experiment as: a wonderfully simple and cogent schema for the process of scientific discovery. In science, as in the playing card experiment, novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation. But Kuhn's proposal is highly problematic; see Brown (2005b) for a more detailed discussion. A brief glimpse of a carefully contrived artefact hardly provides an accurate model for scientific observation. If one seeks to use this experiment as a model of how scientists collect evidence, we should look to the activities of the experimenters, not their subjects. The experimenters were not limited to glimpsing items that other experimenters had contrived in 1 I have pursued it in considerable detail in my Conceptual Systems (2007) which builds on work of Wilfrid Sellars that pre-dates the most-widely discussed contributions to the "new philosophy of science"; see especially Sellars (1953) and the essays "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," "Is There a Synthetic A Priori?" and "Reflections on Language Games," in his (1963a); for a later statement see Sellars (1974) . C. I. Lewis provides an earlier attempt to develop an account of meaning that is completely divorced from any dependence on sensory experience; see especially his (1956), originally published in (1929) . order to challenge familiar expectations. In addition, the suggestion that scientists have difficulty noticing anomalies runs contrary to the overwhelming body of Kuhn's discussion. One of Kuhn's most important theses is that anomalies are not always counter-examples. In arguing for this thesis, Kuhn discusses numerous cases in which scientists recognized anomalous outcomes and responded in various ways, such as taking them as problems for further research. Thus, while failures to notice what does not conform to our expectations no doubt occur, it is hardly a basis for understanding evidence collection in science. Let us move on to some more viable respects in which evidence may be theory-dependent.
A more moderate version holds that our concepts and beliefs play a role in the constitution of our sensory experience, but also emphasizes the presence of some other element that limits the range of interpretations. Consider ambiguous figures such as the duck/rabbit. While I can see this figure as a duck, a rabbit, or perhaps as an unusual alembic, I cannot see it as anything I choose. Only a limited range of perceptual shifts is available. In a similar way, I cannot experience the water in my glass as cognac or prevent the glass from falling if I let it go, just by changing my interpretation. Theory-laden perception is not theory-generated perception.
There is a way of thinking about such cases that will provide a more useful approach to understanding the role of evidence in science. Evidence that is used to evaluate a theory does not consist of subjective experiences. Rather, it consists of statements that can enter into logical relations with other statements.
2 Statements of evidence describe intersubjectively available situations such as the reading on a dial or a pattern on a photograph. We access these situations by means of our senses, but (outside of some psychological studies) scientists do not describe properties of their sensory experience. As long as researchers agree on what is occurring in a particular situation, the details of their sensory experiences do not matter. Researchers may agree on the outcome of an experiment even if one of them reads these results from a computer screen while another hears the results after it has been run through a voice synthesizer; see Brown (2005b) for further discussion. There are important, unresolved, problems about the internal processes that lead us from sensory awareness of some situation to a statement that can count as evidence. I will not attempt to say anything about those processes here. In this paper I will take evidence to consist of appropriately generated statements. Nor will I propose a general account of what counts as an "appropriately generated statement." This is highly contextual and it is sufficient that those involved in assessing a theory agree that a proposition is appropriate.
Theory-dependence arises, on this approach, because advocates of different theories offer different descriptions of what they recognize to be a single situation. Hanson stressed this point when he introduced the notion of theory-laden observation, although he was discussing sensory experience: "wherever it makes sense to say that two scientists looking at x do not see the same thing, there must always be a prior sense in which they do see the same thing" (1958, 5) . This is what happens in the case of our falling glass. We can recognize that we are discussing the same falling object whether we describe it as moving to a natural place, as responding to a gravitational force, or as following a local geodesic. Moreover, along with theory-based differences in their descriptions, scientists can also describe the object as a falling glass. But this takes us to our next version of theory-dependence.
According to a third theory-dependence thesis, for empirical evidence to be relevant to the evaluation of a theory, that evidence must be described using the language of that theory. I think this claim is correct, but its significance must not be exaggerated. The need to describe evidence using the concepts of a theory provides no impediment to recognizing and reporting evidence that either supports or challenges that theory. In addition, we come into a scientific situation with a body linguistic resources that goes well beyond what is needed to discuss the case at hand. Proponents of competing theories will typically be able to find a description on which they agree even if they disagree on its role as evidence for or against a particular theory. When I describe an item as a falling glass I am using everyday English to produce a description that is neutral with respect to the three interpretations just mentioned. We can understand this description independently of our current scientific beliefs and our knowledge of the history of science. While talk of a falling glass involves concepts and perhaps other cognitive imports, it does not involve the special terminology of any of the three theories I have noted. Galileo was also using common language when he discussed where a stone dropped from the mast of a moving ship would land. In a similar way, astronomers long agreed on the pattern of motion of the planets against the background of the stars whether they were Ptolemaics, Braheans, Newtonians, or Einsteinians. Even when researchers dispute whether a particular outcome occurred, sufficient language will usually be available for the disputants to clearly state the subject of their disagreement.
In general, while evidence statements may be theory-laden in many ways, a fair choice among competing theories does not require that evidence statements be formulated in language that is independent of all theoretical elements. It requires only that these descriptions be neutral with respect to the theories in question.
A fourth version of theory-dependence holds that accepted theory determines which observations scientists undertake. This is surely correct and important. The range of items we can explore is too vast to be pursued without some guidance. If I set out to describe the table in front of me without some notion of what is worth describing, I would not finish in my lifetime. But once we decide what we are going to examine, our expectations do not pre-determine what we will find. The history of science reminds us that this process often yields results that challenge the very theory that is guiding our search. As Kuhn frequently notes, working within a framework sharpens one's sensitivity to anomalies (e.g., 1962, 24, 52, 64-65) . In addition, empirical research sometimes provides unexpected results that cannot be accommodated by any existing theory. Classic examples include the discovery of sperm in the seventeenth century, and the successive discoveries of X rays in 1895 and radioactivity the following year. Encounters of this sort provide one major impetus for generating new concepts and new theories. Even outside of science, nature often impinges on us in ways that we did not anticipate and would prefer to avoid. For example, societies have been disrupted by incursions from other societies that have a superior military technology, and this occurs even though the losers in these encounters may have never imagined the existence of such societies.
My final version of theory-dependence holds that evidence gathered to evaluate a comprehensive theory presupposes that very theory in a way that prevents a fair test. As a result, it is claimed, empirical tests of fundamental theories are viciously circular. But we have already noted that this is not true in general; scientists working within a theory regularly recognize situations that pose a challenge to that theory. Kuhn (1962) provides a convenient starting point for compiling such a list of such cases. Moreover, I have argued elsewhere (1993, 1994 ) that even when a complex evidence-gathering procedure presupposes a theory in a central way, it may still be possible for the outcome of the procedure to contradict that very theory. Whether this can occur depends on the details of the procedure, and it is a mistake to declare that a circle has been found without examining these details. Shogenji (2000) has shown that in many such cases the theory being evaluated is "presupposed" only in the way that we assume a theory in setting up an hypothetical-deductive test or a reductio ad absurdum argument.
Skeptics about the significance of theory testing often move, at this point, to the DuhemQuine thesis and thereby bring in another way in which interpretation enters into scientific procedures. They note that scientifically significant predictions require multiple premises. As a result, when faced with a problematic empirical outcome it is always possible, as a matter of logic, to protect a favored belief by challenging one or more different propositions in this set. But invoking this thesis acknowledges that we have encountered an evidential result that contradicts theory-generated expectations, and that this requires modification somewhere in the set of beliefs that generated the now-problematic result. The Duhem-Quine thesis, moreover, goes hand-in-hand with the claim that theories form an holistic structure in which changes in one member have consequences for other members of the set. But, as Greenwood (1990) has noted, changes anywhere in such a set may generate consequences for what we will find in other situations. As long as we are committed to getting the empirical results correct-and without this commitment we are not doing science-then we cannot make just any change we wish in order to accommodate unwanted evidence. In particular, the oft-repeated claim that any specific thesis can be protected come what may is seriously open to question. It would be interesting, for example, to explore the changes in the current body of science that would be needed to reintroduce the thesis that the earth is at the center of the universe and made of different materials than the moon and planets. While there is flexibility in our interpretation of the import of a body of evidence, this flexibility occurs only within limits set by powerful empirical constraints.
Quine, at one point, suggests that if sufficiently desperate we can reject an observation by declaring that the observer is hallucinating (1963, 43) . But this assumes that evidence in science consists of brief glimpses by epistemically isolated individuals; we have already noted that this is not the case. The retrograde motions of the planets, the motion of projectiles, the evidence for radioactivity, and myriad other examples, all involve temporally enduring, intersubjectively available items. If these are hallucinations, they are persistent and wide-spread. On Quinean grounds, the claim that these are hallucinations is one more claim to be included in the web of belief, and subject to evaluation along with other such claims. This claim will not stand up to Quinean pragmatic evaluation.
Three outcomes of the discussion in this section will be central for the remainder of this paper. First, the empirical evidence against which we evaluate scientific theories does not consist of subjective sensory experiences. Rather, empirical evidence is intersubjective, often persists through time, and enters into scientific discussion via statements. While multiple descriptions of a situation are typically possible, this is quite different from holding that any description at all will do. When we are actually describing some situation, the range of descriptions is tightly constrained by what we find there. In the remainder of this paper the expression empirical evidence will refer to statements describing situations that those involved in theory assessment deem relevant to this assessment. I will also use empirical procedure for any procedure that yields empirical evidence. It encompasses both controlled experiments and cases of the sort that are common in, for example, astronomy, field biology and geology where evidence is acquired without experimental controls. I will say more about such procedures shortly. I will henceforth avoid use of "observation" and "observable" in presenting my own view because of the philosophical history in which observation is identified with having sensory experience.
Second, the two forms of theory-dependence that occur do not prevent the fair evaluation of theories. A description that is relevant to the evaluation of a specific theory must be couched in the language of that theory. In addition, theory guides decisions about which evidence to seek. But neither of these forms of theory-dependence prevent the occurrence or recognition of empirical outcomes that challenge the theories involved.
Third, the availability of multiple descriptions for an empirical outcome is not just a source of scepticism about the import of evidence. Rather, the ability to shift descriptions also underlines the scope researchers have for finding a mutually acceptable description of a situation in terms of language they share even if they support radically different theories. Galileo and an Aristotelian can predict where a stone dropped from the mast of a moving ship will land, state these predictions in a shared language, and recognize that they disagree. When the experiment is done, they can also agree on where the stone landed even while disagreeing on why it landed where it did, and on the significance of this outcome for their favored theories. We will encounter further examples of this kind of situation in the next section as I develop this account of empirical evidence in greater detail.
Empirical Evidence
A proper understanding of empirical evidence, I have been arguing, requires that we wean ourselves from a central thesis of traditional empiricism: that empirical evidence consists of sensory experiences. Kuhn, and many other exponents of historical philosophy of science, never made this step. They shifted from the view that empirical evidence consists of experiences that are independent of any theory, to the view that these experiences are theory-laden. But they never doubted that evidence is to be identified with what an individual scientist perceives. As a result, they failed to note that-as I shall argue shortly-the theory-dependence of evidence points to a richer body of empirical constraints on theories than was recognized in the older empiricist tradition. The situation is somewhat ironic in the case of those who urge that philosophers look at what scientists actually do.
3 I want to explore some of the lessons we should learn about evidence from engaging in this endeavor.
I will focus on empirical procedures that involve the use of instruments because modern instrumentation increases both the role of interpretation and the constraints on these interpretations. While the systematic use of instrumentation enters scientific research with Galileo's use of the telescope, at least one even more striking instrument was common at an earlier date: the magnetic compass, which allows us to see the direction of the earth's magnetic field even though we have no senses that respond to magnetism. The earth's magnetic field is one example of a central feature of the development of science: the postulation of items that we cannot detect with our unaided senses. This was deeply troubling to logical empiricists. Hempel, for example, asserted that science aims at "establishing explanatory and predictive order among . . . the phenomena that can be 'directly observed' by us" and noted that, it is a remarkable fact, therefore, that the greatest advances in scientific systematization have not been accomplished by means of laws referring explicitly to observables, i.e., to things and events that are ascertainable by direct observation, but rather by means of laws that speak of various hypothetical, or theoretical, entities, i.e., presumptive objects, events, and attributes which cannot be perceived or otherwise directly observed by us (1965, 177) .
A very different attitude, one that is typical of naturalist realism, was expressed by Sellars: "It would be odd if the only qualitative dimensions of the world were those which are tied to the sensory centers of the human brain " (1963b, 149) . Theory construction provides the means by which we endeavor to describe such items, and instrumentation provides the means by which we attempt to interact with these items in order to test our theories about them. The theories that postulate such items must play a central role in designing the procedures by which we attempt to test those theories, and in interpreting the outcomes of those tests. These outcomes then provide constraints on our theories. This theory-guided attempt to interact with items that may exist in nature provides the central theme in the account of empirical evidence that I want to explore. 4 This will make more sense if we have an example before us, so I want to outline the solar neutrino experiments that play a central role in an ongoing research project. I will begin with some historical background on neutrinos.
Neutrinos were postulated in the early 1930s as a desperate attempt to solve a set of problems that arose in the study of beta decay, one of the three types of radioactivity. Beta decay occurs when a nucleus emits an electron, and one of the problems was that energy seemed to be missing, which would violate conservation of energy. Attempts to solve this problem included the suggestion by Bohr (and others) that energy conservation is a statistical effect and does not apply to individuals interactions, Dirac's proposal that energy conservation is a low-velocity effect that breaks down at relativistic velocities, and Pauli's proposal that there is an additional undetected particle involved in beta decay that carries the missing energy (and solves the other problems). Pauli was skeptical about his own proposal (Pais 1986, 315), but Fermi soon developed it into a serious mathematical theory. Initially there seemed to be no way to detect neutrinos, and thus no way to test the theory, because neutrinos, as postulated, have no electric charge and no rest mass. However, in a quantum-theoretical context this implies only that the interactions between neutrinos and other matter needed to trigger a detector are highly improbable. Thus given a sufficiently rich source of neutrinos and a sufficiently sensitive detector, neutrinos might be detected. At the time no one had any idea how this could be done but these requirements were met over the next twenty years: nuclear reactors provided a rich source of neutrinos, and during the 1950s Reines and Cowan succeed in detecting them. By 1956 physicists were confident that they could measure the rate at which neutrinos are produced by a reactor (Reines and Cowan 1953 ). I now want to jump to another scientific field.
By the early 1960s the problem of how stars-including our sun-generate energy was considered solved. Still, the accepted account had an untested consequence: the processes that produce the energy should produce neutrinos at quite specific rates and with specific energies. Given the new-found confidence that neutrinos can be detected and counted, in 1962 Raymond Davis proposed an experiment that would measure the rate at which neutrinos produced in the sun arrive at the earth. Davis' detector has been described as "conceptually straightforward, but technologically very difficult" (Trimble and Reines 1973, 1) . The heart of the detector is a large tank containing a common cleaning fluid, C 2 Cl 4 , about a mile underground in a gold mine in South Dakota. The earth above the detector will filter out any particles from space other than neutrinos-although a small number of neutrinos, and other particles that can mimic the neutrino signal, will be produced by radioactive trace elements in the surrounding earth. Occasionally a neutrino will be captured by a chlorine nucleus which will be transformed into an argon atom. Argon will occur in the tank as a dissolved gas that can be periodically flushed from the tank (by a fairly complex set of chemical procedures). This gas is radioactive with a well-established half-life, so the amount produced in a given time period can be determined by recording its radioactive decays. I have skipped many details but the point I want to note is that the first published data (Davis, Harmer, and Hofman 1968) indicated that the neutrino flux was about one-third of the calculated amount; continuing runs confirmed this result. Something was clearly wrong somewhere. "The critical problem is to determine whether the discrepancy is due to faulty astronomy, faulty physics, or faulty chemistry" (Trimble and Reines 1973, 1) . In other words, the question was whether the problem lay in the presumed theory of neutrinos, the theory of stellar-energy production that was explicitly being tested, or the chemistry involved in removing very small amounts of argon from the tank. There are other options as well since many initial conditions, such as the sun's composition, internal temperature, and magnetic fields, are involved in calculating a predicted neutrino flux.
5
Scientists involved in the experiment and in the ensuing discussions took these options very seriously. For example, the chemistry was carefully reevaluated and tested; this strengthened the experimenters' confidence in this aspect of the experiment. In addition, the low neutrino account enhanced concerns about the role of radioactive elements in the rock surrounding the detector. This led to systematic measurements at various depths, to an increase in shielding around the detector, and to a redesign of the instrument used to determine the amount of argon produced; for detailed discussions see Bahcall (1990) ; Franklin (2001) . The low neutrino count was sustained and physicists now sought ways of overcoming limits inherent in Davis' experiment. In particular, by 1962 two different types of neutrinos had been identified; a third type was discovered in 1975. Davis' experiment could detect only one of these types, electron neutrinos. Stellar theory also predicts that different reactions involved in stellar-energy production produce neutrinos of different energies. Davis' experiment could detect only the highest-energy electron neutrinos, considerably less than one-percent of the total number predicted. Scientists responded by developing new experiments that could detect neutrinos with a wider variety of energies, different types of neutrinos, the direction from which the neutrinos are coming, and more.
By the late 1990s a consensus was reached in the physics community that the astrophysical theory originally under test was ok, and that the problem lay with the theory of neutrinos-in particular, with the thesis that neutrinos have no rest mass. Why is this relevant? While the various experiments were going on, theories were developed in which neutrinos have rest mass; these theories predict that neutrinos change type as they move along (the technical term is that they oscillate). Thus a neutrino deficit can result if some of the electron neutrinos originally produced in the sun change type making them undetectable by Davis' detector. While other types of neutrinos will become electron neutrinos, these will have energies that are too low to be registered by Davis' detector. This modified view of neutrinos, which has significant consequences for other features of high-energy physics, is currently being tested in new experiments.
I want to underline three points that emerge from this tale. First, while the extant theory of neutrinos played a central role in the design of Davis' experiment and in descriptions of its outcome as a neutrino count, this did not prevent the outcome from being recognized as a challenge to that very theory. It was immediately clear that something is wrong in the complex of theory and initial conditions that guided this experiment. Without guidance from that body of theory, no such challenge would have been found. Second, whatever the eventual diagnosis of this problem, the solar neutrino experiments have yielded a body of outputs that provide constraints on future theories in this field.
Third, our senses play only a tangential role in this experiment. To be sure, we depend on our senses to read neutrino counters, but this is not what traditional empiricists were after when they advocated a foundational role for our senses in the acquisition of knowledge. For example, the color, size, and shape of readings on digital counters are irrelevant to the role of their output as evidence for theory evaluation. It would not matter if the neutrino count were displayed in Roman numerals, or channeled through a voice synthesizer and detected aurally, or printed out in Braille. Our senses play a pragmatic role since this is the route by which information finds its way into our brains, but the items we can sense have no foundational role in this process. 6 Let us focus for a moment on item two. The outcome of any well-done empirical procedure provides a permanent constraint on future theorizing in its domain, although the outcome may take on a very different interpretation than was adopted by the original researchers. For example, after the development of special relativity the outcome of the Michelson-Morley experiment was interpreted as showing the absence of an ether, but this was not how it was originally interpreted. The original purpose of the experiment was to compare two different views of motion through the ether: a view which held that the earth moves freely through the ether, and one which held that the earth drags ether along as it moves. In its original context the outcome supported the latter view. Indeed, to suggest that it indicated the absence of an ether would have made the experiment unintelligible. The experiment was developed on the basis of the wave theory of light, and no one at that time could make sense of this theory without an ether. But, again, it is possible to describe the outcome of the experiment without using the language of either relativity or its predecessor theories. The experimenters were looking for a specific change in a visible pattern, but no such change occurred. The description I have just given uses language that was available to the actors at the time as a part of their shared culture; this description could be checked without knowing anything about the theories under test. Moreover, any new theory in this domain will have to account for the outcome of this experiment.
Sometimes empirical outcomes provide constraints in fields that were not originally under discussion. For example, in 1987 several neutrino detectors around the world responded to some phenomenon for which they had not been designed. It was quickly determined that they were responding to a supernova that was also detected by more traditional means. This led scientists to recognize that neutrinos provide a previously untapped source of information about stellar processes with the result that neutrino telescopes are now under construction. These will operate along with the optical telescopes that have been in play since Galileo, and the radio, X-ray, and other telescopes that have been developed during the last few decades. As a result of these developments, fields of study that had previously been pursued independently of each other are now linked together so that the range of theses that can be altered in response to a problematic outcome has grown. But the impact of a specific change in this complex has also grown so that we have an increase in both the range of available interpretations and in the constraints on acceptable interpretations. 7 Determining what constitutes a reasonable defense of a theory, or of a decision to eliminate a theory, are among the central questions of philosophy of science and of epistemology in general. Addressing these questions would require, at least, an account of induction, and would be beyond the scope of this paper even if I had such an account.
The growing variety of telescopes provides one illustration of the central scientific drive to extend the range of our interactions with nature-and thereby increase the constraints that theories must meet. This increase in the constraints on our theories results because scientists have learned to use theories as a basis for extending the range of our interactions with nature and thus increasing the opportunities for nature to provide input into the development of science. It may well be that no body of constraints, no matter how rich, will ever dictate a single theory in any field of scientific research. But these constraints do limit the range of theories that can be reasonably defended. Elimination of theories from the class of serious contenders is one way in which we make progress in learning about nature. It is an open question just how far we can constrain the set of admissible theories in a particular domain.
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I have been working towards a way of thinking about the empirical testing of scientific theories that is in part traditional and in part novel. On this approach, scientific theories make claims about some aspects of nature; tests of a theory require that one endeavor to interact with those aspects. This, in turn, requires that the theory, along with currently accepted auxiliary theories, are sufficiently well developed to allow researchers to do two things: find a means of interacting with the items in question, and predict the outcomes of those interactions. Davis' solar-neutrino experiment is an example of such a testing procedure. The experiment provided a new test of the extant account of stellar processes by interacting with a star in a way that had never been attempted before. The procedure is highly indirect and involves multiple theories, but those theories provide the grounds for attempting this interaction. Note especially that such procedures involve attempts to interact with a presumed aspect of nature. A failed attempt to carry out an intended interaction may be just as important an outcome as a result in which the attempt succeeds but does not fit the detailed expectations. Suppose, in the solar-neutrino case, that no neutrinos at all had been detected. This would have been at least as important an outcome as detecting a neutrino flux that differs from that which had been predicted-it is simply another case in which the outcome of a procedure differs from the predicted outcome. But this possibility underlines an important point: in a sufficiently well-developed theoretical context, finding nothing can be an important result, while finding nothing without an appropriate theoretical framework will typically have no epistemic significance at all. The theories that provide the basis for designing such empirical procedures and interpreting their outcomes thus have an enabling function: without these theories we would not be able to design procedures that may result in a challenge to those very theories, and that provide new constraints on future theorizing.
Since the involvement of theories in the process of acquiring evidence serves as a source of skepticism in much philosophical literature, I want to dwell for a moment on the enabling role that theories play in our attempts to study nature. Without the guidance of theory we would never have looked for evidence of the motion of the earth through the ether, for solar neutrinos, for the Higgs boson, and for much else that has been central to the development of science. One of the key lessons of this development is that nature is full of items that we cannot detect with our unaided senses. Many of these items are more fruitful for understanding nature than the items that we can easily detect (as both Hempel and Sellars recognized). Theories that introduce such "non-observables" have enhanced our predictive ability as well as our ability to develop new technologies. We can discover and study these "theoretical" items-but only with the guidance of theories that indicate their existence and properties. And these theories can be tested, improved, and sometimes replaced as a result of the testing procedure. Thus the introduction and testing of theories plays a central role in the discovery of unanticipated features of nature, and in providing new constraints on theories that are already in play and on future theories.
Consider, now, some other features of this interaction between interpretation and constraint. First, the permanent possibility of varying interpretations of the outcome of an empirical procedure often points the way to further interactions that yield new constraints. So the possibility of alternative interpretations is not solely a reason for scepticism about the epistemic significance of theory-dependent evidence. Second, sometimes proponents of a theory cannot find an interpretation of an empirical outcome within the framework of that theory. This provides a particularly pressing challenge to the theory. Third, a changing theoretical context can change the scope of an empirical outcome. For example, in a pre-Copernican framework studies of our sun would not be relevant to our understanding of the stars. But once we have come to view the sun as a fairly typical star, we can study stars by studying the sun (and conversely). As a result, our understanding of stellar-energy production is constrained by our understanding of solar-energy production. Fourth, it is worth repeating that there is no need for empirical outcomes to be described in language that is independent of all theoretical interpretations. When competing theories are being compared, empirical outcomes need only be described in language that is independent of those theories. Proponents of each theory can then redescribe the evidence in the language of their favored theory and determine whether the results conform to theory-generated expectations. Such situations are common in the history of science; I will add one further example. In the current debates over the interpretation of quantum theory, Bohm's account of what is going on at the microlevel is quite different from that of the Copenhagen account, but there is agreement that both accounts yield the same experimental outcomes. It is the failure (so far) to derive different predictions from the two accounts that makes the choice between them so intractable. Note also that a neutral language is not required when a single theory is being tested.
I will end this section by underling some affinities and differences between this account of the role of evidence in assessing theories and some older views in the philosophy of science. To a large degree, the proposed account is a traditional hypothetico-deductive approach-except that it drops the foundational role of sensory experience that has often been associated with this account. The view I am presenting agrees with Popper's account of the central role of theory-elimination in scientific progress. However, the overall approach differs from Popper's in two key respects. On the present view perceptual experience-such as occurs when reading a counter or examining the environment-plays an epistemically significant role in constraining evidence descriptions; these descriptions are not just conventions. In addition, I do not adopt Popper's rejection of any form of positive support for a theory. My account also encapsulates the traditional requirement that theories should be subject to continual testing, and that competing theories should imply different results for at least some further tests. At the same time, I agree with Feyerabend that the introduction of new theories provides a major means of developing new empirical tests and expanding the set of constraints on our theorizing.
Incommensurability
I turn now to incommensurability, a theme that has played a central role in philosophy of science since 1962 and that is widely viewed as generating major problems for theoryevaluation and for any form of realism. Incommensurability arises because of the existence of alternative theories with fundamentally different conceptual systems. I have argued elsewhere (2001) that such differences are unavoidable if science is to develop correct accounts of many domains because the concepts needed to describe these domains develop out of the research process. Yet the existence of deep conceptual change raises several questions about how science develops and where it is heading. I will consider three areas in which such problem that have been prominent in the literature: communication, theory evaluation, and realism.
It is widely held that the existence of different theories with different conceptual structures generates problems of communication between proponents of these theories. Many people (including Kuhn some of the time) treat a theory as a language. They then write as if each of us is locked into a single language that leaves us without cognitive resources when faced with a different language that cannot be directly translated into our own. But, as Kuhn eventually recognized, many people are multi-lingual and shift between languages with no great difficulty. In a similar way, a physics professor may teach classical thermodynamics in the morning and quantum theory in the afternoon while doing research in general relativity-and adopt classical notions of space and time when planning a vacation or a tryst. Physics students manage to study all of these without confusion. Moreover, while treating a theory as a language is illuminating in some contexts, it is quite misleading when taken to extremes; see Sankey (1994, Ch. 3) for an important discussion. Natural languages are much richer than scientific theories, and there is no particular difficulty in discussing alternative theories in a single natural language, or a single theory in different natural languages. The ability to deal with multiple theories is especially clear when we look at major innovators. Galileo, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein, for example, were complete masters of the theories they endeavored to supersede. Because of this, they were able to present results in ways that were understandable to all interested parties and that might even encourage others to do the work necessary to learn how they arrived at their results. There is, once again, no great difficulty in noting where a stone dropped from the top of the mast of a moving ship lands, or the visible outcome of the Michelson-Morley experiment, and in describing these outcomes in language that is common to all those concerned, whatever difficulties may remain about explaining these results.
In addition, translation into my current language is not the only way of learning a new language. There is a theme that is central to Kuhn 1962 but drops out of much of his later work, although it eventually reappears. When we examine scientific research-that is, the process, instead of just the product-we find that the conduct of research, along with theory assessment and communication, depend on a variety of human cognitive skills. In particular, languages and theories are created by humans who have such skills for the use of other humans who share those skills. We draw on those skills when we endeavor to understand a language or theory that embodies an unfamiliar conceptual system. Discussing the case of the historian (who must often deal with larger conceptual gaps than does the scientist involved in actual theory choice), Kuhn (2000, 77) writes:
Faced with untranslatable statements, the historian becomes bilingual, first learning the lexicon required to frame the problematic statements and then, if it seems relevant, comparing the whole older system (a lexicon plus the science developed with it) to the system in current use.
A few years earlier Kuhn (2000, 53, cf. 238) wrote:
Translation is, of course, only the first resort of those who seek comprehension. Communication can be established in its absence. But where translation is not feasible, the very different processes of interpretation and language acquisition are required. These processes are not arcane. Historians, anthropologists, and perhaps small children engage in them every day.
Kuhn also tells us that "anything which can be said in one language can, with imagination and effort, be understood by a speaker of another. What is prerequisite to such understanding, however, is not translation but language learning" (ibid., 61). And, "with sufficient patience and effort, [one can] discover the categories of another culture or of an earlier stage of one's own" (ibid., 220).
Kuhn has also backed away from his earlier metaphor of a scientific revolution as a gestalt shift (although this may still be an appropriate analogy for some historical research). "To speak, as I repeatedly have, of a community's undergoing a gestalt shift is to compress an extended process into an instant, leaving no room for the microprocesses by which the change is achieved" (ibid., 88). Let me note one important example. A key part of Kuhn's original argument consists of a comparison of the conceptual systems of Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics. But, as Kuhn eventually noted (ibid., 87), Newton never argued against Aristotle. By the time Newton came on the scene Aristotelian mechanics was effectively dead. Newton's opponent was Descartes, and the conceptual gap between Newton and Descartes was considerably smaller than that between Newton and Aristotle; see Brown (2007 Ch. 9 ) for a detailed account.
But once understanding has been achieved, two further questions remain: the grounds for accepting one of a set of competing theories, and the grounds for believing that the theory we accept is true. It is important that we separate these questions. Kuhn (2000, 112-13) pressed this point when he distinguished the grounds for belief from the grounds for incremental change of belief. The first of these is the problem of realism; I will address it shortly. The second is the problem of theory choice. Even when the debate is between two false theories, there remains a difference between an epistemically appropriate process of choice and one that is arbitrary or based on inappropriate considerations. While there is much that is unclear about the appropriate grounds for theory choice, it is by now clear that an adequate account requires that we consider more than just formal relations between theories and evidence-although these are an important part of the story. One additional item has already been noted: the cognitive skills that people bring to bear in carrying out evaluations. These skills extend well beyond those required for learning a new system of concepts. They include all of the abilities that one acquires as one develops expertise in a specific field. 8 The guiding idea here is that we are seeking an account of theory choice that is relevant to human beings, not to some ideal agent with powers and abilities that greatly exceed those of mortal folk. As we come to understand these abilities we can also develop a normative account of evaluation built on an understanding of how we can best use these abilities. While this approach requires careful attention to human psychology, attention to our cognitive abilities was central for seventeenth-and eighteenth-century empiricists. From an historical perspective, this "new" approach returns empiricism to its roots. Kuhn's focus on the role of scientists in the development of science places him in this ongoing tradition.
We come, at last, to the question of scientific realism-to the grounds for believing that a scientific theory is true, or, at least, closer to the truth than the theories that it supercedes. It should be clear from the above discussion that a normatively correct decision to accept a particular theory at a particular time does not imply that the theory is either true or a step in some linear progress towards the truth. In many historical situations no one is in a position to formulate a good approximation to the correct account of a domain because the required concepts have not yet been developed. Central concepts from relativity and quantum mechanics did not enter into Newton's arguments against Descartes or into his own mechanics. Modern genetics-and its basis in biochemistry-played no role in Darwin's account of evolution, and Kelvin's argument that geological time was too short for Darwin's needs foundered on a lack of knowledge of radioactivity and nuclear fusion (Burchfield 1975) . At the present stage of metascientific research, the historical record of conceptual change is a vital part of the data base with which we must come to terms. Its considerable anti-realist force has recently been pressed by Stanford (2006) as "the problem of unconceived possibilities." 9 This is a more fundamental issue than the much-discussed pessimistic induction. That problem, which focuses on the falsity of previous theories, can arise without any need for new concepts as science develops. But the history of conceptual change reminds us that we may not yet have a clue what concepts will be required for a correct account. Kuhn (e.g., 2000, 243-4) eventually insisted that incommensurability is important only as an argument against realism; see Brown (2005a) and (2007 Ch. 11) for a detailed discussion.
There is, I submit, only one reason for believing that we may be moving towards true beliefs in at least some domains: the growth of the evidential constraints on our theories. Contemporary theories such as relativity, quantum theory, plate tectonics, and the evolution of species face more demanding tests than did the theories of our ancestors. These contemporary tests are both more varied and, in some fields, more precise than any that occurred in the past. And, we have seen, even when a theory is rejected because it fails to pass an empirical test, the process of theory testing yields further constraints on new theories that may be proposed in its domain. This growing body of constraints has led to the rejection of vast arrays of older theories (in accord with the scientifically appropriate standards). In addition, known constraints have prevented the introduction of even vaster arrays of logically possible theories that no one has been foolish enough to seriously propose.
Note, finally, the multiple roles of theories in this process. Theories embody our accounts of what items exist in a domain and of how they behave. Because of this, theories also provide the grounds for seeking particular kinds of evidence and for interpreting the outcomes of this quest. Since our theories are fallible, both our accounts of specific domains and our understanding of the evidence are also fallible. Yet it is these same theories that lead us to seek new ways of interacting with nature, which increases the constraints on our theories and provides our only reason for thinking that we may be stumbling towards a correct account.
